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In this article we present a possible way to make usual quantum mechanics fully compatible with
physical realism, defined as the statement that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural
world, existing independently from any particular observer’s perception, and obeying universal and
intelligible rules. Rather than elaborating on the quantum formalism itself, we propose to modify
the quantum ontology, by requiring that physical properties are attributed jointly to the system,
and to the context in which it is embedded. In combination with a quantization principle, this
non-classical definition of physical reality sheds new light on counter-intuitive features of quantum
mechanics such as the origin of probabilities, non-locality, and the quantum-classical boundary.
I. HISTORICAL REMINDERS
It is well known that physicists, while they all agree
about how to use Quantum Mechanics (QM), still all dis-
agree about what it means, and even more about“the real
stuff” it describes: that is, its ontology. However, let us
take as a basis for an agreement the two statements that
(i) the quantum formalism is correct, and (ii) the quan-
tum ontology must agree with physical realism, which
states that the goal of physics is to study entities of the
natural world, existing independently from any particular
observer’s perception, and obeying universal and intelli-
gible rules1. Then the disagreement quoted above finds
its roots in the difficulty to make (i) and (ii) compati-
ble, as it has been much debated in the literature [1–11],
giving rise to many different interpretations of QM [12].
The purpose of this article is to propose and discuss
a way to have the quantum formalism (i) and physical
realism (ii) both correct and compatible, so that many
different views and practices about QM can stay essen-
tially unchanged. As usual, there is a price to pay, but the
currency will be ontological: it will be a subtle but deep
change in what is meant by physical properties, which
should not any more be considered as properties of the
system itself, but jointly attributed to the system, and
to the context in which it is embedded (precise defini-
tions will be given below). We will show also that this
ontological change has strong links with quantization as
a basic physical phenomenon, and that this combination
can explain why QM must be a probabilistic theory.
Let us start with the simple question: what is a quan-
tum state ? Since current answers do not meet a large
agreement between physicists, it may be useful to remem-
ber that before QM, “classical” physicists used to work
with physical states, that pertained to physical systems.
Physical systems are entities of the natural world that
can be isolated well enough to study them, measure their
properties, i.e. “ask them questions” (what is your posi-
tion, mass, velocity...). The set of answers resulting from
1 Some philosophical background is given in the Annex.
a given set of questions defines a physical state, that is,
the ID card of the physical system. Once this ID card
is known, the behavior of the system becomes perfectly
predictable from the equations of motion, and answers
to new questions are predictable as well2. In the par-
ticular case where the measured properties are constant
of the motion, the same questions will invariably give
the same answers, whatever their total number, or the
ordering of their sequence. This is consistent with at-
tributing a physical state to the system itself, so that the
system “is” in that state, even if nobody is there to look
at it [7]. This property is often thought as the core of
objectivity, and more generally, corresponds to ordinary
ontology, i.e., our usual way of seeing (classical) reality.
With the rise of QM, the notion of physical state was
seriously shaken. In particular, it appeared impossible to
obtain as many certain answers as possible questions, i.e.
to get the full ID card of the system. At early times of
the quantum theory, this resulted in the famous Einstein-
Bohr debate [1, 2, 4, 6], with opposite claims that either
the physical state exists like in classical physics, but then
QM would be incomplete [1], or that QM would be com-
plete, but then the full physical state does not exist, at
least not in a classical sense [2]. Then many different
interpretations of QM have been proposed, and our pur-
pose here is not to discuss all of them [12], but rather
to examine another, maybe more philosophical, perspec-
tive: assuming physical realism, can we spell out a phys-
ical reality suitable for QM, and what are the practical
consequences of such an ontological approach?
In Sec. II, we will present and discuss the current - of-
ten implicit - quantum ontology. Then in Sec. III and IV,
we will introduce our approach, closely related to “con-
textual objectivity” [8, 9]. Important consequences will
be presented in Sec. V to VIII, and some related philo-
sophical considerations will be discussed in the Annex.
2 This is clearly an idealized view of classical mechanics, ignoring
e.g. chaotic systems, but what matters is that classical mechanics
do behave generically in such a way.
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2FIG. 1: A H-polarized single photon is successively analyzed
by three polarizers oriented at either 0◦, 45◦ and 90◦ (a) or 0◦,
90◦ and 45◦ (b). The overall probability of being transmitted
is respectively either 1/4 (a) or 0 (b).
II. USUAL QUANTUM ONTOLOGY
Nowadays in QM, one is accustomed to the idea that
when studying a physical system, the full ID card, cor-
responding to the ensemble of answers to all the possible
questions one can ask, is not accessible, and that the de-
scription must be restricted to the“quantum state”, quite
different from what the “classical state” used to be. A
paradigmatic example of such quantum state is the pho-
ton polarization. It is usually measured with a polarizing
beam-splitter, that can be rotated by a continuous angle
θ. By definition, the polarization is |Hθ〉 (resp. |Vθ〉)
if the photon is transmitted (resp. reflected) with cer-
tainty by a θ oriented beam-splitter. In agreement with
the Malus law that applies for classical light, a photon of
polarization |Hθ=0〉 sent in a θ 6= 0 oriented beam-splitter
will be either transmitted with probability cos2(θ), or re-
flected with probability sin2(θ). After the measurement,
the photon is projected on the state |Hθ〉 (resp. |Vθ〉).
This simple picture (Fig. 1) gathers important charac-
teristics of quantum mechanics. First, there are indeed
less certain answers than possible questions, meaning in
that specific example that the photon polarization cannot
be known with certainty for all θ angles. Second, results
of successive measurements depend on the ordering of
the sequence; for instance, it is not equivalent to measure
the polarization successively in the basis {0◦, 45◦, 90◦}, or
{0◦, 90◦, 45◦} - in other words, measurements do not com-
mute3. These characteristics derive from the fact that
3 Classically one could do the same experiment with a polarized
light wave, and also get different results according to the order-
ing of the polarizers. However the interpretation is completely
different : the classical polarization “has” an orientation in space,
which can be determined by carrying out more measurements,
whereas the photon can only give a probabilistic yes/no answer.
measurement is a projection, from an initial state onto
an eigenstate associated with a “measurement context”.
Even if this conception is commonly spread, it holds
many unsolved questions that makes the understanding
of quantum mechanics a vivid field of debates and inter-
pretations, more than a hundred years after it was born
[19–29]. For instance, on the ontological side, what does
the quantum state represent: our knowledge of reality, or
reality itself - in other words, is the wave function epis-
temic, or ontic, or a bit of both [11] ? What happens
during a measurement, at the microscopic scale ? Where
do probabilities come from, and how to justify them ?
What happens during an EPR / Bell experiment carried
out on entangled particles, and what is this “spooky ac-
tion at a distance” that affects Bob’s photon, when Alice
measures hers ? Last but not least, measurement is at
the heart of the usual quantum description - but is it
possible to describe the world out of any measurement
process, and thus to get rid of the so-called quantum-
classical boundary [5, 10] ?
In the following we propose an alternative ontology
for quantum mechanics. Let us emphasize that an on-
tology, that aims to define “what reality is”, can never
be demonstrated, but is rather a “thinking framework”,
which is chosen for both intuitive and practical reasons.
Our strategy will therefore consist in going back to the
roots of ontology, unveil and question our intuitions on
what reality is, and eventually, take the freedom to choose
a new direction. In particular, in the same way that
quantum physicists progressively gave up with the idea
that the quantum state should consist of the full ID card
of the system, here we will question the fact that the
quantum state should pertain to the system alone. As de-
tailed below, our perspective sheds new light on the set of
conundrums reminded above, but it is unavoidable that
other ontologies may also fit with the same mathematical
theory - which one gives the “best fit” is ultimately the
choice to be made.
III. SYSTEM, CONTEXT, AND MODALITIES
To define an ontology, our main guideline is to start
from the basic question: what can we be certain of ?
More precisely, within the physical framework we are in-
terested in, which phenomena can we predict with cer-
tainty, and obtain repeatedly ? Though a full “ID card”
in the classical sense is no more available as said above,
certainty and repeatability of phenomena will allow us to
identify some items of an ID card, by providing necessary
conditions to be able to define a “state”. Such an ap-
proach, supported by quantum experiments, has a clear
relationship with the criteria for physical reality given by
EPR [1] – but the following will be different.
Our quantum ontology will thus involve three entities
of different natures. First comes the system, that is - as
stated above - a subpart of the world that is isolated well
enough to be studied. The system is in contact with other
3systems, that can be a measuring device, an environment
- no need to be more specific at this point. The ensemble
of these other systems will be called a context. A given
context corresponds to a given set of questions, that can
be asked together to the system. A set of answers that
can be predicted with certainty and obtained repeatedly
within such a context will be called a modality. Given
these definitions, let us bind them together by the follow-
ing rule: In QM, modalities are attributed jointly
to the system and the context. This principle will
be called“CSM”, referring to the combination of Context,
System, and Modality4. As a set of certain and repeat-
able phenomena, a modality fulfills the above conditions
for the objective definition of a quantum state5.
At this point we can emphasize that the context is
classical, in the sense that no other context has to be
specified to define its state. Note that here neither size,
nor a quantitative criterium has been made to draw the
quantum-classical boundary: the quantum vs classical
behavior is only related to the CSM principle itself, i.e.,
to the very definition of a modality.
Obviously, CSM applies to the photon example quoted
above: the system is the photon, the θ-oriented polar-
izer is the context, and the two possible exclusive an-
swers/modalities in this context are either “transmitted”,
or “reflected”. To predict with certainty if a photon will
be transmitted or reflected, one has to know the modal-
ity, which includes the context it corresponds to - the
angle of the polarizer in that case6. In the CSM per-
spective, a photon does not “own” a polarization, but the
ensemble photon-polarizer does. If the context is known,
and if the system is available, a modality defined in this
same context can be recovered without error. This prop-
erty has been exploited for years by quantum commu-
nication technologies, and provides the core of quantum
cryptography protocols [13]. Here, we have drawn the
consequences of this behavior in ontological terms.
The resulting ontology is clearly different from the clas-
sical one, where it is expected that a state should “exist”
independently of any context to guarantee objectivity.
But even if CSM is fundamentally non-classical, physical
4 This is clearly an idealized view of how QM works, but besides
agreeing with the usual formalism, there is abundant experimen-
tal evidence that individual quantum objects do behave this way.
5 With respect to the usual QM formalism, a modality corresponds
to a pure state. We adopt here the usual view that statistical
mixtures correspond to an extra layer of classical probabilities,
added over a truly quantum structure provided by pure states.
We note also that the crucial idea of certainty and repeatability
is associated with projective measurements. On the other hand,
“blurred” measurements (such as POVM’s) may be very useful
tools, but they don’t provide fully predictable and repeatable
results, and therefore they are not relevant for our purpose.
6 In practice our definitions can be restricted to some sub-ensemble
of contexts, relevant for some degrees of freedom of the complete
physical system. What actually matters is that the transforma-
tions within the relevant set of contexts have the mathematical
structure of a continuous group, see section IV.
realism is not lost: it still pertains to the ensemble made
of context, system, and modality. Objectivity, defined
as the independence from any particular observer’s per-
ception, is still guaranteed, but the “object” is the system
and the context, and its “properties” are modalities [8, 9].
It might even be argued that the CSM principle should
apply to classical ontology as well, since physical states
always show up in a given context. As mentioned in the
introduction however, in classical physics the ordering of
the questions, i.e. of the contexts that are successively
in contact with the system, does not have any influence
on the results, and all the questions can get a definite
answer. As a consequence, the context can be forgotten,
and the modality can be fully attributed to the system
alone - giving birth to the ordinary classical ontology.
On the contrary, in QM, the ordering in the succession of
the questions has a strong influence on the answers ob-
tained (see Fig. 1), and therefore the context cannot be
forgotten. Hence the non-commutation of measurements
mentioned above is intimately related to the CSM prin-
ciple; we will come back to this in the discussion below.
Finally, after quoting EPR at the beginning of this
section, let us emphasize that the CSM principle is not
foreign to Bohr’s view, as expressed in his answer to the
EPR argument [1, 2]: “The very conditions which define
the possible types of predictions regarding the future be-
havior of the system constitute an inherent element of
the description of any phenomenon to which the term
physical reality can be properly attached”. In this
sentence, Bohr explicitly states that despite being classi-
cal, the “very conditions” (i.e., the context) must appear
together with the system in the description of quantum
phenomena. In the following, we show that the CSM
principle does not come as a bolt from the blue, but is
actually tightly bound to a quantization principle.
IV. QUANTIZATION PRINCIPLE
Let us consider the situation pictured in Fig. 2: a
quantum system is described within a set of contexts,
whose parameters can be changed continuously, whereas
the measurement results (the modalities) are discrete and
in a finite number7. This is a quite general and canoni-
cal situation of quantum mechanics, which describes for
instance spins interacting with a Stern-Gerlach appara-
tus, photons analyzed with polarizing beam-splitters, or
quantum measurements on an ensemble of qubits.
In a given context, the modalities are “mutually exclu-
sive”, meaning that if one modality is true, the others
are wrong. On the other hand, modalities obtained in
different contexts are generally not mutually exclusive:
7 For continuous systems, see remark in section VII. The full con-
sideration of infinite dimension deserves more discussion, and is
postponed to another article [15].
4FIG. 2: Illustration of the quantization principle for a spin
5/2 measured by a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. There is a con-
tinuous infinity of possible contexts, labelled by the angle ~θ of
the magnetic field gradient, but only N=6 mutually exclusive
modalities. The number of spots, corresponding to the num-
ber of modalities for a given orientation ~θ, does not change
while rotating the apparatus.
they are said to be “incompatible”, meaning that if one
modality is true, one cannot tell whether the others are
true or wrong. This terminology applies to modalities,
not to contexts, that are classically defined: changing
the context results from changing the measurement ap-
paratus at the macroscopic level, that is, “turning the
knobs”. These context transformations have the math-
ematical structure of a continuous group, that will be
denoted G: the combination of several transformations
is associative and gives a new transformation, there is a
neutral element (corresponding to no change of context),
and each transformation has an inverse. In the following,
we will thus consider infinitely many contexts, all related
by the continuous group G, and belonging to a set C.
These definitions allow us to state the following quan-
tization principle:
(i) For each well-defined system and context,
there is a discrete number N of mutually exclusive
modalities. This number N does not depend on
any particular context within the set C.
(ii) Modalities, when defined in different con-
texts within C, are generally not mutually exclu-
sive, and they are said to be “incompatible”.
Otherwise stated, whereas infinitely many questions
can be asked, corresponding to all possible contexts, only
a finite number N of mutually exclusive modalities can
be obtained8 (Fig. 2). An essential consequence is that
it is impossible to get more details on a given system by
combining several contexts, because this would create a
new context with more than N mutually exclusive modal-
ities, contradicting the above quantization principle. The
8 This principle is reminiscent of other approaches which bound the
information extractable from a quantum system [22, 26]. How-
ever, in the realist perspective we chose, quantization has not a
purely informational character, but characterizes reality itself.
resulting impossibility to define a unique context where
all modalities are mutually exclusive also makes that
the succession of observed modalities depends on the se-
quence of contexts applied to the system (Fig. 1). As
mentioned above, it is therefore forbidden to attribute
definite physical properties to the system alone, in agree-
ment with the CSM principle. Note that in our perspec-
tive, CSM does not show up because of some practical
reasons pertaining to the measurement protocol, but is
intimately linked to the quantization principle. In the fol-
lowing, we revisit some of the main features of quantum
theory within this new framework.
V. PROBABILITIES
As a first important conceptual consequence, we ar-
gue that quantum mechanics must be a probabilistic the-
ory, not due to any “hidden variables”, but due to the
ontology of the theory. The argument runs as follows:
let us consider a single system, two different contexts
C1 and C2, and the associated modalities M(C1, n) and
M(C2,m), where n and m go from 1 to N. As said above,
the quantization principle forbids to gather all the modal-
ities M(C1, n) and M(C2,m) in a single set of 2N mutu-
ally exclusive modalities. Looking for instance at photon
polarization (N=2), it impossible to know with certainty
one the four possible results for the photon going through
a polarizer oriented at 0◦, and through a polarizer ori-
ented at 45◦. Therefore the only relevant question to
be answered by the theory is: if the initial modality is
M(C1, n) in context C1, what is the conditional proba-
bility for obtaining modality M(C2,m) when the context
is changed from C1 to C2 ? Again, such a probabilis-
tic description is the unavoidable consequence of the im-
possibility to define a unique context making all modal-
ities mutually exclusive, as it would be done in classical
physics. It appears therefore as a joint consequence of the
quantization and CSM principles, i.e. that modalities are
quantized, and require a context to be defined.
Note that in the CSM picture as described so far, a
“measurement” is nothing but a change of context. As
we will see in section VII, this does not forbids to look
for a more microscopic description of a measurement, e.g.
by coupling the initial system to an “ancilla”. But this
will simply lead to define some new and larger system and
context, in which the previous scheme will apply again.
VI. ABOUT THE EPR ARGUMENT
Second, CSM sheds new light on the EPR argument
[1]. To show this, let us consider two spin 1/2 particles
in the singlet state, shared between Alice and Bob. The
singlet state is a modality among four mutually exclusive
modalities defined in a context relevant for the two spins,
where measurements of the total spin (and any compo-
nent of this spin) will certainly and repeatedly give a zero
5value. On the other hand, the singlet state is incompat-
ible with any modality attributing definite values to the
spin components of the separate particles in their own
(spatially separated) contexts.
Now, let us assume that Alice performs a measurement
on her particle, far from Bob’s particle. Alice’s result is
random as expected, but what happens on Bob’s side?
Since Bob’s particle is far away, the answer is simply
that nothing happens. How to explain the strong corre-
lation between measurements on the two particles? By
the fact that after her measurement, Alice can predict
with certainty the state of Bob’s particle; however, this
certainty applies jointly to the new context (owned by
Alice) and to the new system (owned by Bob). The so-
called“quantum non-locality”arises from this separation,
and the hidden variables from the impossible attempt to
attribute properties to Bob’s particle only, whereas prop-
erties must be attributed jointly to Alice’s context and
Bob’s system. Getting them together is required for any
further step, hence the irrelevance of any influence on
Bob’s system following Alice’s measurement. Here the
separation between context and system is particularly
obvious and crucial, since they are in different places9.
According to the above reasoning, after Alice’s mea-
surement on one particle from a pair of particles in a sin-
glet state, the “reality” is a modality for Bob’s particle,
within Alice’s context. But Bob may also do a measure-
ment, independently from Alice, and then the “reality”
will be a modality for Alice’s particle, within Bob’s con-
text. Does that mean that we have two “contradictories”
realities ? Actually no, because these realities are contex-
tual : for instance Alice’s modality tells that if Bob does
a measurement in the same context as Alice, he will find
with certainty a result opposite to Alice’s one (given the
initial singlet state). This statement is obviously true, as
well as the one obtained by exchanging Alice and Bob.
But if Bob does a measurement in another context (dif-
ferent from Alice’s), then one gets a probabilistic change
of context for a N=2 system, as described before.
If Alice and Bob both do measurements with different
orientations of their analyzers, the simplest reasoning is
to consider the complete context for both particles, which
is initially a joint context (with a modality which is the
singlet state) and finally two separated contexts, again
with 4 possible modalities due to the quantization postu-
late. Then this is now a probabilistic change of context
for a N=4 system, again with the same result.
It is interesting to write a few equations about these
9 In order to define a modality, i.e. a set of values that can be
predicted with certainty, there is no need for a physical contact
between the context and the system. Moreover, the context is
not the whole physical environment, but only the classical data
required to define the modality, e.g., the polarizer’s orientation,
which can be classically broadcasted. But checking the predicted
results does require the actual measurement to be done, i.e. the
context and the system “meeting” at the same place.
initial, “intermediate” and final modalities, because this
allows us to see more explicitly where CSM differs from
Bell’s hypothesis, even before the quantum formalism is
introduced. So let us denote ai, bj the modalities with
results i, j = ±1 for some orientation (context) a for
Alice, and b for Bob. Given some “hidden variables” λ,
and using the vertical bar “|” as the usual notation for
conditional probabilities p(X|Y ), Bell’s hypothesis are :
p(ai, bj |λ) = p(ai|λ) p(bj |λ)
The equivalent CSM equations, given the initial joint
modality µ, are for Alice, who knows µ and ai
p(ai, bj |µ) = p(ai|µ) p(bj |µ, ai)
whereas they are for Bob, who knows µ and bj
p(ai, bj |µ) = p(ai|µ, bj) p(bj |µ).
So these equations clearly differ from Bell’s hypothesis,
though there is no action at a distance, and no faster
than light signalling. However, there is some non-locality,
in the sense that the result on one side depends on the
result on the other side; but this is only through a (local)
redefinition of the context, not through any influence at
a distance onto the remote particle. Again, it is essential
here to consider that the modality belongs jointly to the
particle(s) and to the context, and not to the particle(s)
only, otherwise one would be lead to Bell’s hypothesis.
Another important consequence is that if Alice and
Bob both do measurements, their realities must ulti-
mately agree together, since there will be a unique final
modality (ai, bj). Therefore their predictions must also
agree together, and one must have
p(ai, bj |µ) = p(ai|µ) p(bj |µ, ai) = p(ai|µ, bj) p(bj |µ)
These equations are just the same as the ones we would
obtain by the usual “instantaneous reduction of the wave
packet”, though in our reasoning there is no wave packet,
and no reduction, but only a measurement performed
by either Alice or Bob on the known initial modality µ.
Even more, if we admit that (µ, ai) is a new modality
for Bob, and (µ, bj) is a new modality for Alice, then
p(bj |µ, ai) or p(ai|µ, bj) cannot be anything else than the
one-particle conditional probabilities, i.e. Malus law for
polarized photons (see section II).
So we get a simple explanation about the famous
“peaceful coexistence” between QM and relativity, i.e.
why quantum correlations are non-local, but also “no sig-
nalling” (they don’t allow one to transmit any faster than
light signal): this is because a modality requires both a
system and a context, and for instance (µ, ai) defines a
modality for Bob’s particle, by using only Alice’s data.
Such a situation, though strongly non-classical, does not
conflict with physical realism or causality: in the CSM
perspective, quantum non-locality is a direct consequence
of the bipartite nature of (quantum) reality.
6VII. EVOLUTION OF MODALITIES
As said above, a modality is fully predictable and re-
producible as long as the context is not changed, and
the system does not evolve. More generally, the system
will evolve, according to some physical laws, and it may
also interact with other systems. As usual in QM, inter-
actions can be treated by combining systems, within a
larger context suitable to define appropriate modalities.
Modalities for the combined systems may be obtained by
defining separate modalities for each sub-system, or by
defining “joint” modalities, which are predictable and re-
producible only in the combined context. Such modalities
correspond to entanglement, as discussed in the above
section about the EPR argument. For two systems with
respectively N1 and N2 mutually exclusive modalities, it
is natural to admit (or postulate) that the combined sys-
tem will admit (N1 ×N2) mutually exclusive modalities.
Considering again one system (possibly combined), the
consequence of its evolution will be that predictability
and reproducibility will be lost in the initial context.
However, one expects that the result of the evolution will
be a new modality, obtained from the initial one through
a deterministic evolution. Therefore there will be a new
context, in which the result of a measurement will again
be fully predictable and reproducible. As it was assumed
before, this new context will be related to the initial one
by some element of the group of contexts transformation
G, and this element, as well as the modality itself, should
be determined by the equations of motion.
At this point, it is essential to note that in an actual
measurement, the system typically interacts with other
systems (ancillas), and gets entangled with them within
a larger context. By naive application of the usual quan-
tum ontology, one does not know how to “stop this pro-
cess”, and in principle the entanglement builds up until
the observer himself is absorbed in the wave function.
Nothing like that occurs in the CSM ontology, because
it is postulated from the beginning that a measurement
carried out in a given context on a system with N ex-
clusive modalities can only give one of these modalities,
with some probability. Even entanglement, as long as it
remains a meaningful concept, makes sense only with re-
spect to an external context, always required for defining
(combined) modalities and using the quantum formal-
ism. Let us point out also that measuring a modality
actually means performing an “ideal QND measurement
[18]”, or a“full projective Von Neumann10 measurement”.
10 This calculation was initially done in Chapter VI of [14], which
considers the ensemble made of I (quantum system) + II (ancilla)
+ III (observer’s device), and shows that for a properly designed
system-ancilla interaction (in modern terms, it should be a QND
interaction [18]), the same result is obtained by applying the
measurement between I and II, or between II and III. Such an
approach fully agrees with CSM, and is very far from a “many
worlds” point of view [24].
In this limit, which is idealized but fully relevant for our
purpose, a measurement is equivalent to a “state prepa-
ration”: this is consistent with the idea that a modality
is defined by the certainty in the initial context, and not
by the uncertainty in the (yet unknown) next contexts.
Therefore there is no “measurement problem” in CSM,
but rather a crucial issue, which is to set up a mathemat-
ical formalism able to calculate probabilities connecting
different modalities in different contexts. The next ques-
tion is then: which mathematical object should we as-
sociate with the physical concept of a modality ? This
will be quickly discussed in the next section, and more
thoroughly in a forthcoming article [15].
VIII. BORN’S FORMULA
We understand now that QM must be a probabilistic
theory, and the theorems by Kochen - Specker and Bell
[5, 6] strongly suggest to find an alternative to classical
probability theory, unless one accepts that it becomes
contextual and non-local. A new probability theory is
therefore desirable, and our framework perfectly fits [15]
with the usual postulate: Let us associate to each modal-
ity a (rank-one) projector in an Hilbert space, so that
any set of N mutually exclusive modalities M(Ci, n) in
a given context Ci is associated to a set of N mutually
orthogonal projectors Π(Ci, n) summing up to identity.
Then Gleason’s theorem [16] states that the only
possible way to write the conditional probability
P [M(C2,m)|M(C1, n)] is as Trace[Π(C2,m).Π(C1, n)]:
this is the usual Born formula. Within the framework
of separable Hilbert spaces (or von Neumann algebra), it
is well known that our initial restriction to a finite dimen-
sion N can actually be lifted, recovering the usual (Dirac
- von Neumann) formulation of QM11 [15].
Since we have now reached the starting point of QM
textbooks [17], it appears that the usual structure of
QM is fully compatible with our approach; in particu-
lar rewriting physical quantities as operators and states
as rays is straightforward. With respect to standard text-
book presentations, the main differences are:
• quantum probabilities do not happen “by chance”
and have nothing to do with ignorance, but they
are a consequence of the quantization postulate;
• quantum non-locality has nothing to do with an
11 Though contexts play a central role in our construction, let us
emphasize that it is “noncontextual” in the sense associated with
Gleason’s theorem: this just means that the same modality can
be found in different contexts. As an example, consider a system
of two spin 1/2 particles ~S1 and ~S2, and define ~S = ~S1 + ~S2.
Using standard notations for coupled and uncoupled basis, the
|m1 = 1/2,m2 = 1/2〉 modality in the context {Sz1, Sz2} is the
same as the |S = 1,mS = 1〉 modality in the context {~S2, Sz},
though other modalities in the same two contexts are different.
7“action at a distance”, but appears because a
modality belongs to both a system and a context;
• there is no “measurement postulate”, since it is al-
ready included in the definition of modalities.
More precisely, in our approach there is no “wave func-
tion” developing upwards and utimately branching into
a “many-world” universe [12], but only (non-classical)
probabilities connecting modalities appearing in differ-
ent contexts. These probabilities are calculated using
the standard quantum formalism, and thus they may in-
volve interfering paths, as usual; however, there is no
“wave”, but only a “wavelike behaviour” due to the quan-
tum way to calculate probabilities, through projections
in an Hilbert space. In this “physically realist” point of
view, the mathematical state vector (or wave function)
should be carefully distinguished from the modality, i.e.
from the phenomenon defining the “object” (see Annex).
IX. CONCLUSION
We shall conclude with a few remarks. First, contex-
tual objectivity [8, 9] allows for an ontology to QM, this
is the joint reality of the context, system, and modali-
ties (CSM). This leads to reinterpret quantum nonlocal-
ity as the situation where the context and the system are
separated in space: though the certainty (modality) is
present, it cannot be “verified” or “actualized” as long as
the context and the system are not put together again.
Such a situation has no conflict with physical realism,
but never happens in classical physics, where the physi-
cal properties are carried by the system alone.
Second, let us note that for many physicists, putting
the context in the very heart of the theory implied an
unacceptable “shifty split” [5, 10] between the quantum
world (attributed to the system) and the classical world
(of the context). A lot of efforts have been made to get
rid of it, especially to make the classical world emerge
from the quantum world, by attempts to describe con-
texts within the quantum formalism. Such attempts may
exploit the fact that there is a considerable flexibility for
defining the boundaries of the system, especially when
considering that (weak or strong) measurements can be
done by entangling the initial system with a “meter” (or
ancilla) system, e.g. by doing Quantum Non Demoli-
tion (QND) measurements [18]. But in our approach,
extending such measurements to include the context is
self-contradictory: even by adding more and more “me-
ters”, the system can never grow up to the point of in-
cluding the context. This is because without the con-
text, modalities cannot be defined, leaving the system as
a fuzzy object including everything, quite unsatisfactory
from the perspective of physical realism.
The quantum-classical boundary has therefore a fun-
damental character, and QM was born from it, both from
a physical and from a philosophical point of view, as it
is discussed in more details in the Annex below. In a
nutshell, the CSM approach presented here, without re-
stricting the generality nor the applicability of QM, ac-
knowledges the fact that, as a scientific discipline, QM
“can explain anything, but not everything” [19].
As a final remark, Bohr’s arguments in [2] were quite
right, but perhaps failed to answer a major question
asked in essence by EPR in [1]: can a physical theory be
“complete” if it does not provide an ontology that should
be clearly compatible with physical realism ? Unveiling
such an ontology is what we propose to do here.
Annex: Some philosophical remarks on the nature of
physical reality.
It should be clear that in present approach, the weight
of philosophy is larger than in many other interpreta-
tions of QM. Since we are still doing physics, and not
philosophy, we present in this Annex some elementary
philosophical considerations, spelling out the conceptual
shifts introduced by the CSM ontology.
From a philosophical point of view, let us first em-
phasize again that we adopt the point of view of physical
realism, telling that the purpose of physics is to study en-
tities of the natural world, existing independently from
any particular observer’s perception, and obeying univer-
sal and intelligible rules. Therefore philosophical issues
like the separation between subject vs object are def-
initely out of our scope: we are interested in defining
“objects” consistent with QM, and we claim this can be
done – though not in a “naive” (classical) sense.
Here we want to discuss an objection which can be
made to CSM, and could also be made to Bohr’s an-
swer to EPR: in ordering to keep the above arguments
consistent, the context seems to acquire a special status,
“evading” the quantum description of reality which is be-
ing built. This objection can be answered relatively eas-
ily, but this requires a distinction between two notions of
reality, that occur frequently in the history of philosophy.
The first kind of reality is the “ultimate material real-
ity”, constituted by all the objects in nature which are,
from a scientific point of view, made of particles, waves
and all their combinations, giving rise to macroscopic ob-
jects. There is no need to be very specific about what this
reality is made of, but it must have a major property: it
does exist - i.e. it is external to our thinking - even if we
know very little about it. And in some sense, we cannot
know much about it, because it is just too complicated.
It also has to be a “global” reality, because no part of
it should play a particular role. It could also be called
“absolute reality”, here we will call it “ultimate reality”.
The second kind of reality is “empirical reality”, this is
the reality of phenomena that are amenable to scientific
knowledge. Empirical reality has two main properties: it
is real, it does exist independently of the “observer”, be-
cause it is obviously included in the ultimate reality; and
it can be known, which means that it can be perceived
and apprehended by observers, as knowledge must (also
8obviously) pertain to perceiving and thinking agents. Sci-
entific knowledge of empirical reality is thus a synthesis
of facts - “what is really going on” (in some subset of
the ultimate reality), - and concepts, elaborated through
the observation and formalization of what is going on. It
is precisely this synthesis that produces “understanding”,
what we sometimes call the “aha!” effect.
As said before, this distinction between ultimate and
empirical realities is very old, probably as old as philoso-
phy, but physicists often ignore it, and think that physics
can address directly the ultimate reality, by defining, at-
tributing and measuring properties that belong uncon-
ditionally to “real objects”. Unfortunately, this way of
thinking leads to a dead end as far as QM is concerned.
Actually, physics always deals with empirical reality,
not with ultimate reality. Its duty is to describe phenom-
ena with mathematical tools, which will allow one to pre-
dict the values of measurable physical quantities. These
measurements and their mathematical formalization take
place in a framework where phenomena can occur and
eventually be described and measured. In practice, this
framework is the classical macroscopic world, and though
this appears only as a practical requirement, it can hardly
be escaped, due to the very nature of empirical reality.
Let us emphasize that this statement does not restrict
physics only to “what can be perceived”. All along its
history, physics has elaborated concepts that take an on-
tological value, such as atoms, and it is perfectly entitled
to do so, because empirical reality is grounded on ulti-
mate reality. Atoms are a very good example of such
a progress: in the 19th century, they were introduced
as abstract hypothetical entities with a strong explana-
tory power, then they were identified, and now they can
easily be “seen” and manipulated at the individual level.
More generally, physical concepts such as photon, elec-
tron, charge, mass, energy, fields... are also entities re-
quired for describing the empirical reality in a synthetic
way, referring again to the above mentioned synthesis of
“what is going on” - the facts out there - and of its ob-
servation and formalization through physical, conceptual
and mathematical tools that belong to science.
Now we can consider again the difference between clas-
sical and quantum mechanics (see Fig. 3). In both, one
deals with empirical reality grounded on ultimate real-
ity, but in classical physics, one can easily get the delu-
sion that knowing the state of the system is knowing
directly the ultimate reality. In quantum mechanics, this
is clearly wrong, because empirical reality must be me-
diated by a classical context, and the latter cannot be
ignored. The context is always part of the ultimate real-
ity, and its own very details in terms of particle, fields etc.
certainly “exist”. However, they are not relevant as far as
the definition of a (CSM) modality is concerned: here the
context is only considered as a necessary practical condi-
tion allowing the physicist to make measurements on the
system, which is a physically-grounded but abstract con-
cept, like the atoms are. The context’s role is to reveal a
phenomenon, the modality, which must be accessible to
FIG. 3: Graphical representations of various ontologies dis-
cussed in the text. The CSM ontology is a much better basis
for physical realism than the usual quantum ontology.
the observer, in ordering for knowledge to take place.
Given all that, a modality in CSM is essentially a“phe-
nomenon” - a matter of fact - which involves a context (as
a practical requirement) and a system (as a physically-
grounded concept), and which provides measurement re-
sults, that can be known and reproduced with certainty.
One should notice that most experiments do not give
access to the “full modality”, because of experimental
imperfections: some properties may not be measured
properly; experimental devices may add some noise, etc.
However, the essential point is that, according to QM,
modalities (i.e., pure quantum states) do exist as real
phenomena, and the whole theory is based on that. In
addition, the modality as a phenomenon is objective, i.e.
it can occur anywhere, and requires no role for belief or
for any agent’s crucial presence. Though observation is
part of scientific knowledge as a human endeavor, it is
not required for the phenomenal existence of a modality.
It should be clear also that the “cut” or “split” [10] is a
requirement at the level of empirical reality, in ordering
to specify the observed phenomenon, but at the level of
ultimate reality, it does not imply that the macroscopic
world is different in nature from the microscopic one. It
rather means that in QM, macroscopic properties are re-
quired to describe phenomena, because the context can-
not be ignored, due to the combination of the CSM and
9quantization postulates introduced above. Therefore for
empirical consistency, the quantum system with its ei-
ther mutually exclusive or incompatible modalities has
to connect somewhere to the macroscopic world, where
quantization does not show up at first sight.
As a conclusion, a lot of trouble in QM results from
a confusion between ultimate reality and empirical re-
ality, associated with the classical delusion of “speaking
directly” about ultimate reality. But this is no more pos-
sible in quantum mechanics, due to the empirical frontier
imposed by the quantization postulate. Again, quantum
mechanics can describe anything, but one should be very
careful with attempts at using it to describe everything.
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